January 25, 2022 ARBITRATION - ORDERS
Claim No: ARB 035/2020
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANC
BETWEEN
MIBOT
Claimant
and
MFAST
Defendant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF H.E JUSTICE SHAMLAN AL SAWALEHI
UPON reviewing the Defendant’s Application No. ARB-035-2020/1 dated 18 April 2021 for the judgment in default of acknowledgment of service dated 15 March 2021 to be set aside (the “Set Aside Application”)
AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s Application No. ARB-035-2020/2 dated 3 May 2021 for the Set Aside Application to be struck out (the “Strike Out Application”)
AND UPON hearing counsel for the Claimant and counsel for the Defendant at the hearing on 3 October 2021
AND UPON reviewing the relevant documents on the Court’s file
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Set Aside Application is dismissed.
2. The Strike Out Application is dismissed.
3. The parties shall bear their own costs of the applications.
Issued by:
Nour Hineidi
Registrar
Date of issue: 25 January 2022
Time: 2pm
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
Introduction
1. The Claimant, Mibot (“Mibot”), is a real estate developer. The Defendant, Mfast (“Mfast”), is an interior fit out company.
2. Mfast asks the Court to set aside judgment entered against it on 15 March 2021 in default of acknowledgment of service (the “DIFC Default Judgment” and the “Set Aside Application”). Mibot asks the Court to strike out the Set Aside Application (the “Strike Out Application”).
3. For the reasons which follow, both applications are dismissed.
Background
The Agreements
4. Mibot and Mfast have two agreements with each other, both of which concern parts of Mibot’s “Mruf” development in Jumeirah Village Circle, Dubai (the “Project” and the “Contracts”). One agreement concerns gypsum works (the “Gypsum Contract”), the other joinery works (the “Joinery Contract”).
5. The Gypsum Contract, entered into on 26 June 2016, was originally between Mfast and Mosla ( “Mosla”), the main contractor of the Project. Clause 36 of the addendum to the Gypsum Contract stipulates that any disputes arising in connection with the Gypsum Contract are required to be resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre.
6. On 1 July 2017, Mibot, Mosla and Mfast entered into a novation agreement by which Mosla transferred its interest and obligations under the Gypsum Contract to Mibot (the “Novation Agreement”). Clause 4.1 of the Novation Agreement stipulates that the Dubai Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear any disputes between the parties arising from that agreement.
7. The Joinery Contract, entered into on 8 February 2018, was between Mibot and Mfast from the start. Clause 4.14 stipulates that the Dubai Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear any disputes between the parties arising from the agreement. Mibot places emphasis on the fact that, pursuant to Clause 1.1 of the Joinery Contract, Mfast undertook to perform obligations arising from a suite of documents, one of which is “Addendum No. 1 dated 1 July 2017”. Pursuant to Clause 12 of Addendum No. 1, any disputes arising in connection with the addendum are required to be resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre (together with Clause 36 of the addendum to the Gypsum Contract, the “Arbitration Agreements”).
8. In both Arbitration Agreements, the DIFC is identified as the seat of arbitration
The Dispute
9. A dispute arose.
10. On 18 March 2020, Mfast filed a civil action against Mibot before the Dubai Court (the “Onshore Claim” and the “Onshore Proceedings”). Mibot responded by filing a defence and a counterclaim. In short, Mfast claimed a sum of AED 17,338,390.74 for alleged outstanding dues for works carried out under the Contracts—that is, both the Gypsum Contract and the Joinery Contract—plus interest, and Mibot counterclaimed a sum of AED 8,463,413 in damages under the Contracts for losses allegedly suffered by it on account of a delay in completion of the Project that Mibot submitted was caused by Mfast, plus interest.
11. On 6 October 2020, the Dubai Court of First Instance issued a judgment granting the Onshore Claim and dismissing the Onshore Counterclaim (the “Onshore CFI Judgment”)
12. On 4 November 2020, Mibot filed an appeal against the Onshore CFI Judgment (the “Onshore Appeal”).
13. On 15 November 2020, Mibot issued proceedings in the DIFC Court (the “DIFC Court Proceedings”), in the Technology and Construction Division. On the claim form, Mibot stated under the heading “Remedy Sought”:
The Claimant requests the Court to issue the following orders and/or judgment: a. Declaring that the Defendant is in breach of its obligations under both Joinery Contract and Gypsum Contract; b. Declaring the Claimant’s entitlement and/or its assignee’s entitlement to encash the Performance Security for Gypsum and the Performance Security for Joinery and all orders to preserve the same and thereto; c. Ordering the Defendant to pay AED
13,452,187 comprising, namely: - AED 1,361,845 for liquidated damages under the Gypsum Contract; - AED 5,264,728 for liquidated damages under the Joinery Contract; - AED 2,041,136 for contra charges under the Joinery Contract; - AED 4,784,478 for loss of gross operating profit based on an indemnity under the Joinery Contract. d. Ordering the Defendant to pay all costs, including the Claimant’s legal fees, court filing fees charges and expenses including expert fees; and e. Ordering the Defendant to pay interest on the outstandings [sic] and on all judgment sums. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant reserves the right to: a. Raise any and all further claims arising out of or in connection with the matters described in this Particulars of Claim or otherwise arising between the Parties; b. Seek interim and provisional measures before this Court or any competent national court (without prejudice to this Court’s jurisdiction); c. Produce such factual or legal arguments or evidence (including witness testimony, expert testimony and documents) as may be necessary to present its case or rebut any case which may be put forward by the Defendant; d. Amend and/or supplement the relief/s sought herein; and e. Apply for an immediate or summary judgment against the Defendant for all or part of its claims.
(the “Initial DIFC Claim”)
It is worth highlighting that there was no mention in the Initial DIFC Claim of either any arbitration agreement or the Onshore Proceedings.
14. On 19 November 2020, Mibot requested by email that the DIFC Court Proceedings be transferred to the Court’s Arbitration Division.
15. On 23 November 2020, Registrar Nour Hineidi granted the request.
16. The same day, Mibot filed a new claim form in the Arbitration Division. The next day, Mibot amended the new claim form. The amended claim form, which does not include much information, made reference to particulars of claim.
17. In particulars of claim dated 24 November 2020 (the “PoC”), Mibot stated under the heading “Reliefs Sought”:
The Claimant requests the Court to issue the following orders and/or judgment:
a. A Declaration that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration clause contained in Clause 36 of the Addendum in the First Sub-Contract Agreement dated 26th June 2016 is binding on the Claimant and Defendant.
b. A Declaration that the DIFC-LCIA arbitration clause contained in Clause 12 of the Addendum in the Second Sub-Contract Agreement dated 8th February 2018 is binding on the Claimant and Defendant.
(the “DIFC Claim”)
There was no mention in the PoC of any dispute, the Dubai Court Proceedings or the Onshore Judgment, nor any intended future arbitral proceedings.
18. On 7 December 2020, Mibot filed an application before the Joint Judicial Committee (the “JJC”), requesting it to determine a supposed conflict of jurisdiction between the Dubai Court and the DIFC Court (the “Claimant’s JJC Application”).
19. On 29 December 2020, the Dubai Court of Appeal dismissed the Onshore Appeal and upheld the Onshore CFI Judgment (the “Onshore CA Judgment”). This decision was not subsequently appealed.
20. On 24 December 2020, Mibot made a request in the DIFC Court Proceedings for judgment in default of acknowledgment of service pursuant to Part 13 of the Rules of the DIFC Court (the “RDC”).
21. On 15 March 2021, default judgment was given i.e. the DIFC Default Judgment. At [2] of the DIFC Default Judgment it was declared that “The arbitration clause contained in clause 36 of the Addendum in the First Sub-Contract Agreement dated 26 June 2016 [i.e. the Gypsum Contract] is binding on the Claimant and Defendant” and at [3] it was declared that “The arbitration clause contained in clause 12 of the Addendum in the Second Sub-Contract Agreement dated 8 February 2018 [i.e. the Joinery Contract] is binding on the Claimant and Defendant”.
22. On 18 April 2021, Mfast filed an application for the DIFC Default Judgment to be set aside i.e. the Set Aside Application.
23. On 3 May 2021, Mibot filed an application for the Set Aside Application to be struck out i.e. the Strike Out Application.
24. On 3 October 2021, Mfast’s and Mibot’s applications were heard (the “Hearing”)
The Set Aside Application
Mfast’s Case
25. Mfast advances its Set Aside Application under RDC rr. 14.1 and 14.2 i.e. it submits that the DIFC Default Judgment must be set aside and, in the alternative, that should be set aside. These rules provide as follows:
14.1
The Court must set aside a judgment entered under Part 13 if judgment was wrongly entered because[:]
(1) in the case of a judgment in default of an acknowledgment of service, any of the conditions in Rules 13.4 and 13.6 was not satisfied;
(2) in the case of a judgment in default of a defence, any of the conditions in Rules 13.5 and 13.6 was not satisfied; or
(3) the whole of the claim was satisfied before judgment was entered.
14.2
In any other case, the Court may, on such conditions as it sees fit, set aside or vary a judgment entered under Part 13 if:
(1) the defendant has a real prospect of successfully defending the claim; or
(2) it appears to the Court that there is some other good reason why:
(a) the judgment should be set aside or varied; or
(b) the defendant should be allowed to defend the claim.
As to the RDC r. 14.1 argument, Mfast submits that Mibot’s claim i.e. the DIFC Claim was satisfied before the DIFC Default Judgment was entered, engaging RDC r. 14.1(3). As to the RDC r. 14.2 argument, Mfast submits that it has a real prospect of successfully defending the DIFC Claim, engaging RDC r. 14.2(1), and, in the alternative, that there is also some other good reason why Mfast should be allowed to defend the DIFC Claim, engaging RDC r. 14.2(2)(b).
Discussion
26. Needless to say, Mfast goes into far more detail in submissions than has been given in the preceding paragraph. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding that no reference has been made to Mibot’s case, in my judgment the Set Aside Application can be disposed of with reference to these key points.
27. While it may be Mibot’s intention to arbitrate the dispute determined by the Dubai Court—that determination taking the form of the Onshore CFI Judgment, upheld by the Onshore CA Judgment, not appealed by Mibot —or more precisely a part thereof, the DIFC Claim concerns the validity of the Arbitration Agreements, not the parties’ substantive dispute, whether determined by the Dubai Courts in breach of the Arbitration Agreements or with the parties’ consent, express or implied. It is Mfast’s case that the Arbitration Agreements were not so much as mentioned in the Onshore Proceedings, never mind invoked or otherwise put before the Dubai Courts. It necessarily follows, in my judgment, that the DIFC Claim, a claim for declarations that the Arbitration Agreements are binding, cannot have been satisfied before the DIFC Default Judgment was entered as such a claim had not previously been made. On this basis I dismiss Mfast’s case under RDC r. 14.1. (I note that it is not at all clear how there could be a conflict of jurisdiction between the Dubai Court and the DIFC Court for the same reason.)
28. As to the question of Mfast’s prospect of successfully defending the DIFC Claim, while Mfast has not expressed it in this way, in my view the question can be reformulated as follows: does Mfast have a real prospect of successfully defending Mibot’s claim that the Arbitration Agreements are binding? In my judgment, the answer to this question is “no”. Mfast has not challenged the validity of the Arbitration Agreements. Its primary position is that Mibot waived its right to invoke the Arbitration Agreements when it filed a defence and counterclaim in the Onshore Proceedings and advanced these cases to conclusion without invoking the Arbitration Agreements. In my view, Mibot waiving a right to invoke the Arbitration Agreements presupposes the Arbitration Agreements being valid and therefore, without more, binding. Unless the Arbitration Agreements were binding, how could Mibot waive a right to invoke them in the Onshore Proceedings?
29. Mibot has not asked the Court to determine the scope of the Arbitration Agreements, whether the subject matter in the Onshore Proceedings or any part thereof fell within that scope or whether the Onshore CFI Judgment and the Onshore CA Judgment were obtained in breach of the Arbitration Agreements rather than with the parties’ consent, express or implied—and for the avoidance of doubt, the Court has not determined any of these questions—which no doubt would have been much more contentious questions. Instead, it has simply asked the Court to declare something that, so far as I am aware, has not been disputed by Mfast, namely that the Arbitration Agreements are binding, without reference, moreover, to any particular dispute or particular proceedings where agreement or waiver of a right to arbitration might operate to put the Arbitration Agreements out of reach for that dispute or in those proceedings
30. In my judgment, the foregoing is a sufficient basis to dismiss Mfast’s RDC r. 14.2 argument also.
The Strike Out Application
31. Mibot’s Strike Out Application is made on several technical bases:
… The Defendant cannot be heard on its application … Up until now, the Defendant failed to file an Acknowledgment of Service ( “AoS”) …
… Alternatively, it is well established that the failure to file the AoS means the Defendant submitted to the DIFC Courts’ jurisdiction …
… The Defendant’s Application is defective on multiple grounds. No relief from sanctions have been filed …
Further and/or alternatively, in the circumstances of the case, the Defendant’s Application to set aside is late …
As Mfast has argued, the arguments that comprise the Strike Out Application could have been conveniently made in response to the Set Aside Application. I do not consider that there was a need for a separate application to be made. More importantly, given my decision on the Set Aside Application, the Strike Out Application does not require determination. I dismiss the application.
Costs
32. The utility of both the Set Aside Application and the Strike Out Application strikes me as being minimal to say the least. Nor is it clear that the DIFC Claim and the DIFC Default Judgment serve any useful purpose. Again, the Court was asked to declare, and it did declare, that the Arbitration Agreements were binding, in circumstances where the same had not, so far as I am aware, been disputed by Mfast. In these circumstances I think it is appropriate to make no order as to costs. Each party shall bear its own costs of the applications.