August 05, 2021 court of first instance - Orders
Claim No. CFI 051/2017
THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
BETWEEN
GLOBEMED GULF HEALTHCARE SOLUTIONS LLC
Claimant
and
OMAN INSURANCE COMPANY PSC
Defendant
ORDER WITH REASONS OF JUSTICE LORD ANGUS GLENNIE
UPON reading the judgment of Justice Sir Richard Field dated 4 October 2020 (the “Judgment”)
AND UPON reading the Order of Justice Sir Richard Field dated 2 March 2021 refusing permission to appeal against the Judgment
AND UPON reviewing the Defendant’s Second Appeal Notice filed on 22 March 2021 applying for permission to appeal against the Judgment (the “Second Permission Application”)
AND UPON reading the Defendant’s skeleton argument of the same date in support of the Second Permission Application
AND UPON reviewing the Claimant’s written submissions in opposition to the Second Permission Application dated 4 July 2021
AND UPON hearing Mr Reed QC for the Defendant and Mr Knight for the Claimant at a hearing on 12 July 2021
AND UPON reviewing the relevant documents on the Court file
IT IS NOW HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Second Permission Application is granted.
2. Costs in the appeal.
Issued by:
Nour Hineidi
Registrar
Date of Issue: 5 August 2021
At: 5.45pm
SCHEDULE OF REASONS
1. This is an oral hearing of an application for permission to appeal the order of Justice Sir Richard Field dated 4 October 2020 refusing the Defendant's application to amend their defence and to lodge a counterclaim. Other aspects of his order are not in dispute.
2. Justice Sir Richard Field himself refused an application for permission to appeal against that order and this is, in effect, a renewed oral application for permission to appeal.
3. The test for permission to appeal is set out in RDC 44.19. Permission to appeal may only be given where the court considers that: (1) the appeal has a real prospect of success, or (2) there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard.
4. The real prospect of success test has been interpreted in a number of cases to mean that there must be a realistic prospect of success rather than a mere fanciful one. But of course, the prospect of success need not be compelling. It is sufficient that it is realistic.
5. It was argued for the Claimant that the Defendant in its skeleton argument and in its grounds of appeal had not identified any error of law and that they were simply seeking a rehearing of the matter. I am not persuaded that this is correct.
6. Applying the test set out in RDC 44.19 I am persuaded, though only just persuaded: first, that it is arguable that the judge gave insufficient weight to the importance of the amendment, in other words, that the case sought to be advanced would, if successful, provide a complete defence to a claim for $36 million-odd; second, that it is arguable that the judge erred in his assessment of culpability for some parts at least of the delay in raising the issue in these proceedings; and third, that it is arguable that the judge placed too much weight on the question of culpability for delay, as he saw it, as opposed to the question of what prejudice, if any, would be suffered by the claimant if the amendment was allowed?
7. It seems to me that these points are at least arguable to the extent of giving rise to a realistic prospect of success, even if no higher than that. For those reasons I propose to grant permission to appeal, and I shall do so.
8. I shall therefore grant permission to appeal and the order for costs will be costs in the appeal.
