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Claim No. CFI 051/2017

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

MONTAL

Claimant/Respondent

and

MINALI

Defendant/Appellant

REASONS FOR ORDER OF THE REGISTRAR DATED 8 DECEMBER 2020

1. On 8 December 2020, the Registry issued my order (“Order”) in respect of the application for a retrospective extension of time filed by the Defendant on 11 November 2020 (“Application”).

2. Paragraph 7 of the Order states that “reasons [for the Order] may be provided at the request of a party”.

3. My reasons are below.

Distinguishing (1) Lila (2) Luliam (3) Laithen (4) Laite (5) Leur v Laither dated 20 April 2020 (the “Lila Case” or “Lila”)

4. The first point to make is that the set of facts in the current case can be distinguished from the facts in the Lila Case. In these proceedings, payment was delayed by two days with the appeal notice filed on 25 October 2020 and proof of payment sent to the Registry on 27 October 2020. On the other hand, in Lila - payment of the appeal notice was grossly delayed by some 30 days. Given the significant delay in payment of the appeal notice - the Respondents to the prospective appeal (the “Lila Respondents”), who were not placed on any notice of the pending application for permission to appeal, had “peace of mind” that the proceedings were at a finality and that they had concluded. It is my understanding that the Lila Respondents had in fact also initiated enforcement against the judgment issued in the substantive case on the basis that the judgment was in final and executory form. It would have been wholly irregular to disrupt the state of affairs and ongoing enforcement proceedings, some 30 days after the expiration of the period to file an application for permission (to appeal), to then allow the registration of a late appeal notice against the Respondents.

5. There were no good grounds (or exceptional grounds for that matter), in Lila, for allowing the registration of the appeal at such late notice. In fact, the prospective Appellant’s solicitor firm had quite carelessly disregarded payment of the filing fee and then maintained throughout the entirety of its Application (through both written and oral submission), with no remorse nor any initiative to seek pardon from the Court, that it had not acted improperly and that the appeal notice was not filed out of time and should be registered.

6. Further, the Appellant’s counsel, in Lila, did nothing to rectify its error in failing to pay on time. It simply occurred to it, a substantial period of time after filing its appeal notice, that it had not received the sealed notice. That then probed it to carry out enquiries with the Registry, approximately one month after filing, casually querying when it might receive the sealed notice. In the current case, while the solicitor firm for the Appellant failed to make payment of the appeal notice on time, it did everything it reasonably could to then rectify the human error of its solicitor with conduct of the matter, thus resolving the error promptly in a matter of two days (by ensuring the proof of payment was provided to the Registry).

7. On this basis, given that the delay in filing (which includes payment of) the application for permission to appeal was not at all excessive (unlike the delay in the Lila Case), and in light of S Law Firm frankness, illustrated in the Third Witness Statement of Lawyer, of its error and oversight, I have exercised my discretion to allow the application for a very short retrospective extension of time.

Administration of Justice

8. Finally, it should be noted that while a solicitor firm has full conduct of its client’s case when it comes on the record, it is ordinarily the case that where the solicitor makes an error, or fails to act in good faith, then its client will unfortunately bear the consequences of those actions. In this situation, the error was a human error. It was a clerical one which could have a severe impact on the administration of justice. S Law Firm has done everything in its power to remedy its error on behalf of its client. It would be tremendously unjust to reprimand the Appellant for its solicitor’s oversight and to prevent the registration of the permission to appeal application.

Costs

9. In light of its error, the Appellant ought to bear the Respondent’s costs of the Application.

Issued by:
Nour Hineidi
Registrar
Date of Issue: 9 December 2020
At: 8am