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Claim No. CFI 090/2023

THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS

IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BETWEEN

THE REGISTRAR OF THE DIFC COURTS

Claimant

and

(1) SHAUN GREGORY MORGAN

First Defendant

(2) FRANKLIN MORGAN LEGAL ADVISORY LLC

Second Defendant

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REASONS FOR THE ORDER OF JUSTICE WAYNE MARTIN DATED 15 MARCH 2024

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SCHEDULE OF REASONS

Summary

1. On 15 March 2024, after the hearing of these proceedings, I ordered that:

2. My reasons for making those orders follow. I will also provide short reasons for the dismissal of an application by the Second Defendant which was inadvertently overlooked at the time I pronounced orders on 15 March 2024.

The Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners

3. As these proceedings concern alleged breaches of the Mandatory Code of Conduct for Legal Practitioners (the “Code”) it is convenient to commence with an analysis of the provisions of the Code which are relevant to these proceedings.

4. The Code was promulgated by the Chief Justice of the Courts on 18 September 2019 in the exercise of the powers conferred by Article 8(5)(b) of Dubai Law No. 7 of 2014. The Code repealed and replaced the Code promulgated as Dispute Resolution Authority Order No. 1 of 2017. The Code was in force at all times material to these proceedings.

The Governing Principles

5. The preamble to Part A of the Code recites:

“The DIFC Courts (“the Court”) were established to uphold the laws of the DIFC and to advance the rule of law by ensuring the just and effective resolution of disputes within the Court’s jurisdiction. By registering with the DIFC Courts to practice in the Court, each individual registered legal practitioner (“Practitioner”) undertakes to act with integrity and independence in support of the Court and the wider community that it serves.”

6. Part A further provides:

7. Part B of the Code specifies the duties owed by practitioners to the Court. Those duties include:

8. Part E of the Code specifies a number of general duties, including:

9. Part F of the Code is concerned with sanctions for breach of the Code. Its provisions include Articles 38 and 39:

10. Part G of the Code is concerned with matters affecting registration of practitioners. In that Part Article 40 provides:

The proceedings

11. The proceedings were commenced by a Claim Form filed by the Registrar on 7 December 2023. The Brief Details of Claim set out on that form referred to Article 40 of the Code although it is clear from the statement of the Registrar filed at the same time, and from the exhibits to that statement, that other aspects of the Code are also alleged to have been breached by each Defendant, including Articles 6, 9(A), 22(J), 23 and 24, which are set out above.

12. The Registrar filed a statement in which she provided particulars of the claim against each Defendant. In [2] of her statement the Registrar summarised that claim in the following terms:

I will adopt the nomenclature used by the Registrar with respect to each Defendant hereafter.

13. In [4] of her statement the Registrar stated that the Registry of the Court was made aware of warnings issued to the public through a number of media releases, most notably being those made by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (“ASIC”) in 2015. The Registrar stated that ASIC issued a number of media releases warning the public not to deal with an individual named Shaun Gregory Morgan, stating that Mr Morgan had been imprisoned in the United States after pleading guilty to an offence involving fraud in connection with the provision of financial services. The Registrar then stated that the Registry was provided with a copy of a judgment of the United States District Court of Utah, which specified that Mr Shaun Morgan was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment as a result of entering a guilty plea in respect of the offences referred to in the ASIC media releases.

14. In [6] of her statement the Registrar asserted that the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (“SFBC”) issued a decision forbidding Mr Morgan from accepting deposits from the public or advertising services in relation to the acceptance of deposits and mandated that Mr Morgan refrain from using the term “bank” for promotional purposes.

15. The Registrar also asserted that there were allegations that in 2006 Mr Morgan was convicted on a plea of guilty and served a prison term in Switzerland for fraud.

16. In [7] of her statement the Registrar asserted her belief that Mr Morgan, being the First Defendant in these proceedings, is the same Mr Morgan as is referred to in the documents which she described. In that context the Registrar refers to Mr Morgan’s personal website, which refers to his achievements and qualifications but does not assert that he was ever admitted to practice as a lawyer in any jurisdiction.

17. In [9] of her statement the Registrar referred to concerns raised by various other practitioners in relation to Mr Morgan, as a result of which the Court sought verification of the information provided in support of Mr Morgan’s registration. In that regard, the Registrar asserted that Mr Morgan provided a certificate of good standing from the “Court of Appeal” in the state of Maryland, and that in his application for registration, Mr Morgan asserted that he was admitted to practice in three jurisdictions in the United States of America, being the state of Maryland, New York State, and the District of Columbia. However, no formal documentation other than the certificate of good standing from the state of Maryland was provided in support of Mr Morgan’s application for registration, although the Registry of the Court confirmed that it was provided with login details relating to Mr Morgan’s membership account at the New York State Bar, and in reliance upon that information Mr Morgan’s registration was approved.

18. However, upon subsequent review of the certificate purportedly provided by the “Court of Appeal” of Maryland, it was considered that the document appeared fraudulent, and bore no official seal or stamp. The Registry thereafter provided the document to a primary source verification company who confirmed that the document did not pass a document tampering test, and expressed the view that at a probability of 87%, the document had been tampered with.

19. In her statement the Registrar noted that after that report was received, she contacted Mr Morgan and FMLA seeking clarification and directing that Mr Morgan provide documents and certificates providing evidence of his registration as a legal practitioner within the jurisdictions upon which he had relied for the purposes of his application for registration. The Registrar noted that as Mr Morgan did not provide any such documents within the time specified, his registration was suspended.¹

20. The Registrar noted in her statement that on 22 November 2023 Mr Obaid Bin Touq Al Marri, who describes himself as the Managing Partner of FMLA (but who does not appear to be admitted to practice as a lawyer in any jurisdiction) provided two certificates to the Court which were said to demonstrate Mr Morgan’s admission as a legal practitioner in the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia. As the Registrar noted in her statement, these documents were provided to consultants for analysis and those consultants reported that the document purportedly from the State of Maryland had been tampered with (at a probability of 93%), whereas the document purportedly from the District of Columbia had been tampered with at a probability of 100%.

21. The Registrar further noted in her statement that the name of the Court of Appeals in Maryland was changed to the Supreme Court of Maryland in December 2022, from which she concluded it is unlikely that certificates purportedly dated 28 March 2023 and 22 November 2023 could have been issued by the Court of Appeals in Maryland.

22. The Registrar further noted that each of those certificates was apparently signed by Suzanne C Johnson, who had been replaced as clerk of the Maryland Court of Appeals by Mr Gregory C Hilton in November 2022, well before the dates specified on the certificates purportedly signed by her as clerk of the Court of Appeals.

23. The Registrar further noted that a search of the Maryland database containing information regarding all attorneys who have been admitted to the Bar in the state of Maryland does not contain Mr Morgan’s name as a registered attorney.

24. The Registrar noted in her statement that she raised these concerns with FMLA, and received a response from Mr Al Marri which included a link to a website which asserted that Suzanne C Johnson was the clerk of the Maryland Court of Appeals. However, the Registrar pointed out to Mr Al Marri that the link he had provided was dated 2018, and was therefore irrelevant to the assertions made with respect to Ms Johnson’s departure from office in November 2022. No further information on that subject has been provided by FMLA.

25. The Registrar also noted in her statement that the Registry was provided with a letter from the Office of Court Administration in New York by a practitioner who was representing a client in a case in which Mr Morgan was representing another party. In that letter it was asserted that following a due and diligent search of the registration records of attorneys admitted to the New York State Bar, no record of an individual with the name Shaun Gregory Morgan had been admitted to practise law in the state of New York since 1920.²

26. The Registrar also noted in her statement that Mr Al Marri has asserted in correspondence to her that FMLA is an international law firm with offices in a number of countries. However, the Registrar’s investigations have not been able to identify any form of international standing for any firm named Franklin Morgan, as a result of which the Registrar concluded that Mr Al Marri’s assertions in this regard are false.

27. The Registrar filed a bundle of the documents to which she referred in her statement at the time these proceedings were commenced. That bundle includes:

28. Contrary to the representations made by Mr Morgan and Mr Al Marri in the correspondence referred to above, no further documentation or verification was provided to the Court, and analysis of the documents which had been provided showed a high probability that they were forged. In those circumstances, the Registrar commenced these proceedings.

29. The day after the proceedings were commenced, directions were made for service of the proceedings and the provision of a written response to the Claim by the Defendants within seven days of service. Service was effected on 8 December 2023.

30. On 15 December 2023 Mr Morgan filed a statement in response to the Application. In that statement Mr Morgan disparaged the quality of the information upon which the Registrar had relied and asserted that it was “illogical to provide and (sic) any substantive response as many of the allegations are unfounded and make no sense.”³

31. In relation to the allegation with respect to Mr Morgan’s conviction in Utah, he asserted that the allegation made no sense because it was asserted that he was released in December 2012, substantially before the expiry of 60 months imprisonment imposed in 2009. However, significantly, Mr Morgan did not assert in his statement that he was not sentenced to imprisonment in Utah or respond substantively to any of the other allegations made against him other than to disparage the quality of the documentation upon which those allegations were based.

32. However, Mr Morgan did assert that if information had been requested, in a closed meeting with the Registrar, he would have advised her that on 9 December 2012 he:

“Received an exoneration from the US Department of Justice, which was given under a sealed order pursuant to very serious misconduct by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. The order was provided under seal, and the agreement giving full exoneration was sealed by the US Federal Court. Unlike internet Google searches which anything can be written or stated without any proof or evidence, the documentation was to be provided to the DIFC Court Registrar prior to reinstatement in the original and attested form. There is many other opportunities to prove the exoneration without the need to provide the sealed order from the Department of Justice, whereby I can provide links to the Securities and Exchange Commission (US) whereby I am and remain a director of public companies in the United States up until 2017 and 2018. If the ‘accusation’ of fraud or even imprisonment of 60 months … is remotely accurate, then how would it have been possible to remain in a public position with the US Government Regulator of Securities.”

33. However, Mr Morgan went on to state that the US public companies of which he had been an officer were no longer listed because their registration had been revoked in 2015. Mr Morgan did not explain how he could have been a director of public companies in the US in 2017 and 2018 if their registration had been revoked in 2015.

34. Mr Morgan further asserted that he had written personally to the Attorney Registration Office of the Courts of New York and confirmed his registration and had been requested to present himself personally in order to confirm his identity in order to provide the required proof of registration certificate and good standing letter. That assertion was purportedly sustained by the provision of a link to a website described as “Lawyer.com”. Mr Morgan further asserted that he had been directed by the Maryland Court of Appeals to provide a personal appearance before the Registrar “based on the exoneration by the US Department of Justice December 9, 2012 and pursuant to the lapsing of the registration in the state of Maryland.” I digress to note the assertion that his registration had lapsed in Maryland is difficult to reconcile with the provision of a Certificate of Good Standing dated 23 November 2023, approximately 21 days prior to Mr Morgan’s statement.

35. Mr Morgan went on to assert that he would “provide to the DIFC Court full legalised documentation attested through the UAE to Embassy in Washington DC and certified through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”.

36. In the statement Mr Morgan also asserted that he was not an officer, director, shareholder or employee of FMLA, but was a Senior Advisor to three entities with similar names to FMLA of which he was “Counsel”. Again, this assertion is difficult to reconcile with correspondence in which Mr Morgan clearly described himself as a partner of FMLA.

37. In his statement Mr Morgan accepted that he would remain suspended until he had provide full legalised and attested documentation.

38. Mr Morgan filed a bundle of exhibits in connection with his statement. That bundle included:

39. Mr Al Marri provided a statement on behalf of FMLA on 15 December 2023. In that statement he describes himself as the Managing Partner of Franklin Morgan from the date of its incorporation on 7 February 2023.

40. In his statement Mr Al Marri asserts:

“The baseless and malicious attacks on Mr Morgan’s character are upsetting and absolutely false and incorrect. I have had the pleasure of knowing Mr Morgan for more than two years, and during that time have seen his exemplary professionalism as it relates to matters of law and corporate advisory.”⁴

41. Mr Al Marri further asserts that:

“Once Mr Morgan is registered with the DIFC Court as a practitioner there is no further requirement to deal with any rumours as the DIFC Court had completed the registration and their own internal process.”⁵

42. He further asserted “I am satisfied that the allegations by [the Registrar] and the internet articles are materially false”.⁶ However, no basis or grounds for that satisfaction are provided in Mr Al Marri’s statement. Rather, much of Mr Al Marri’s statement is concerned with his communications with the Court and his attempts to arrange meetings with various officers and a Judge of the Court.

43. Mr Al Marri’s statement also deals with an attempt to register another practitioner on behalf of FMLA.

44. In his statement Mr Al Marri asserts that:

“It is undeniable that this action is undertaken not at the behest of the DIFC Court or the Registrar … but done at the bidding of Defendants or Defendants’ legal representatives, trying to avoid proceedings before the DIFC Courts.”⁷

45. While it is true that the legal representatives of other parties to proceedings in which Mr Morgan was involved complained to the Court with respect to his conduct, there appears to be no basis whatever for Mr Al Marri’s extraordinary assertion that these proceedings had not been commenced at the behest of the Registrar.

46. Much of Mr Al Marri’s statement is concerned with irrelevant assertions of collaboration between various parties to damage his firm. Conspicuously missing from Mr Al Marri’s statement is any attempt to respond to the detailed allegations made by the Registrar with respect to the presentation to the Court of forged documents by both Mr Morgan and Mr Al Marri. Nor is there any reference to Mr Al Marri’s conspicuous failure to make good the promises made in his email communications to the Court to provide properly verified and attested documentation proving Mr Morgan’s qualifications for admission.

47. FMLA filed a bundle of exhibits with Mr Al Marri’s statement. The documents in that bundle are either duplicates of documents filed by Mr Morgan, or are irrelevant to the issues in the proceedings.

48. On 21 December 2023 the Registrar filed another bundle of exhibits, being documents referred to in a document within the earlier bundle. That bundle includes the following documents:

49. On 28 December 2023 Mr Morgan filed a second statement. The statement commenced by disparaging the veracity of the documents in the bundle recently filed by the Registrar and reiterated the assertion from his earlier statement to the effect that “it seems unnecessary to spend wasted time reviewing each exhibit”.

50. In this statement Mr Morgan reiterated his earlier assertion that if he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 60 months on 11 January 2010, he could not have been released on 12 October 2012. However, as with the first statement, the second statement is limited to disparaging the evidence adduced by the Registrar. Significantly, there was still no explicit assertion by Mr Morgan that he was not convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for fraud in the United States.

51. In the second statement Mr Morgan asserted that “based on a simple search in the United States of America, there are 29 people with the name Shaun Gregory Morgan who have a criminal record”. However, no verification of that assertion was provided.

52. In his second statement Mr Morgan asserted that he had never submitted any fraudulent documents to the DIFC Court Registration Authority and would provide to the Court full legalised documentation attested through the UAE Embassy in Washington DC and certified through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

53. On 15 January 2024 FMLA applied for an order for reinstatement to the DIFC Court Register. The application was supported by a second witness statement filed by Mr Al Marri. In that statement Mr Al Marri asserted that he had been advised by Mr Morgan that the information which had been requested by the Court would be provided on or before 10 February 2024.

54. In his second statement Mr Al Marri also referred to FMLA’s unsuccessful attempt to register three additional lawyers who are employed by that company.

55. On 30 January 2024 the Registrar filed a statement in response to the application by FMLA. In that statement the Registrar advised that she relied upon the evidence filed in support of the substantive proceedings, and in particular, the fact that FMLA had, on multiple occasions, misled the Court and provided fraudulent documentation on behalf of Mr Morgan. The Registrar further stated that the Registrations Department of the Court had taken the view that all three persons nominated for registration by FMLA were not appropriately qualified. But in any event, it is the Registrar’s view that FMLA should be precluded from representing clients before the DIFC Courts because it had presented various fraudulent documents to the Court.

56. On 31 January 2024, FMLA filed another application seeking the permanent removal of Mr Shaun Morgan from the Registration of Practitioners relating to FMLA, and reinstatement of FMLA to the Register of the DIFC Courts. This application was supported by a third statement of Mr Al Marri. In that statement he asserted that the nature of the complaint was focussed on Mr Morgan, and not FMLA. I digress to observe that this assertion reveals a serious misapprehension as to the nature of the proceedings against FMLA, which are explicitly based upon its presentation of forged documents to the Court, and repeated assertions by FMLA that Mr Morgan was a reputable legal practitioner admitted to practice in various jurisdictions in the United States.

57. In his third statement Mr Al Marri asserted that Mr Morgan is not, has never been, and never will be an employee of FMLA.

58. On 14 February 2024 the Registrar filed a statement in response to FMLA’s application of 31 January 2024. In that statement the Registrar pointed out that when Mr Morgan applied for registration as a DIFC practitioner he asserted that he joined Franklin Morgan (UAE) in March 2023 after 4.5 years as a partner with Franklin Morgan Law PA, a well reputed law firm in Washington DC and New York. The Registrar stated that if, in fact, Mr Morgan was never an employee of FMLA, FMLA was under a duty to promptly inform the DIFC Courts of that fact. The Registrar reiterated her earlier statement to the effect that the application was opposed on the ground that FMLA had misled the Court and provided fraudulent documentation to the Court.

59. On 19 February 2024 I dismissed FMLA’s application of 15 January 2024 for reasons published on that date. In short, I observed that FMLA had been suspended because of serious allegations of misconduct made against that firm in these proceedings. As those allegations had not been resolved, and indeed, the firm had made no serious attempt to refute them in the evidence filed in response to these proceedings, there was no reason to lift the suspension of the firm.

60. On 20 February 2024 the Registrar filed another report from Dataflow relating to the analysis of a document apparently provided to the Court by Mr Morgan in February 2024. The document is another copy of a Certificate of Good Standing purportedly issued by the Court of Appeals of Maryland on 22 November 2023. The document is accompanied by a document apparently signed by Mr Morgan certifying that the document is the true copy of an original. That document purports to be notarised by a notary in Virginia, “completed via remote online notarisation using two way audio/video technology”.

61. The report includes an email from a clerk of the Supreme Court of Maryland to Dataflow stating:

“The document you attached is not legitimate. There is no attorney in Maryland with the name shown on the certificate. Further, the certificate which is dated in November 2023, bears the name and signature of someone who was not an employee of the Court at that time.”

62. Another report from Dataflow was filed on the same date. This report states that the metadata relating to the document provided by Mr Morgan in February shows that the document was created on 12 February 2024, whereas it bears a date of 22 November 2023. The report further observed that “content such as names and dates appear to be inserted separately and in a different font and size”.

63. On 1 March 2024 Mr Morgan filed a skeleton argument in opposition to the application. In that skeleton Mr Morgan made the baseless assertion that the proceedings were “frivolously brought by the Registrar of the DIFC Courts under the direction of lawyers/or law firms wishing to seek removal of Shaun Morgan and FMLA … to protect their clients against litigation”.

64. In the skeleton Mr Morgan asserted that the evidence upon which the Registrar relies is nothing more than internet articles or narcissistic journalism. He further states that he had agreed to his removal from the Register of Practitioners and would not seek reinstatement, so the matter should not have been put before the Court.

65. Mr Morgan reiterated his assertion that “it is pointless to refute all the baseless allegations submitted by the Registrar”. The skeleton further asserted that the matter should have been referred to alternative dispute resolution, and that the claim had not been effectively served (although of course Mr Morgan has actively participated in these proceedings since their inception).

66. Mr Morgan stated that notarised documents proving his registration as an attorney in the US would be provided to the DIFC Court, attested by the UAE Embassy in Washington and further attested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Abu Dhabi. He asserted that he had not had sufficient time within which to obtain those documents.

67. On 1 March 2024 FMLA filed a skeleton argument in opposition to the application. As with other documents filed by FMLA in relation to these proceedings, no attempt is made in the skeleton to grapple with the gravamen of the Registrar’s complaint against FMLA, which relates to the provision of misleading information and forged documents to the Court.

68. Rather, the skeleton is concerned with disparaging the officers of the Court with whom Mr Al Marri has dealt and an attempt to distance the firm from Mr Morgan on the basis that he has never been a manager, shareholder, or employee of FMLA, while accepting that Mr Morgan was “at counsel” for FMLA.

70. Like Mr Morgan, FMLA also raised an issue in its skeleton with respect to the adequacy of service of the proceedings, notwithstanding its active participation in the proceedings since their commencement.

71. The skeleton concluded with the assertion that the proceedings disclose no basis for a claim against FMLA, because the fraud alleged was attributed to Mr Morgan, not the firm. I repeat that assertions of this kind reflect an apparent failure to comprehend the nature of the claim against FMLA, notwithstanding the Registrar’s explicit statement of that claim on several occasions.

72. The proceedings were heard by me on 14 March 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, I pronounced the orders which are set out at the commencement of these reasons, and which were issued in writing on 15 March 2024

73. At the commencement of the hearing the Registrar made an opening statement drawing attention to the significant components of her complaint against each of Mr Morgan and FMLA. In relation to Mr Morgan, he had failed to disclose his previous convictions and imprisonment in the United States and Switzerland and submitted forged documents in support of his application for registration. He had also falsely asserted that he was a registered practitioner in various other jurisdictions in the United States.

74. The claim against FMLA is focussed upon the fact that it submitted forged documents in response to a request for verification of Mr Morgan’s entitlement to registration as a practitioner. In response to a question from me, the Registrar confirmed that the claim against Mr Morgan was brought pursuant to Article 40 of the Code in relation to his previous imprisonment, and secondly and in the alternative, pursuant to Article 38 of the Code, relating to general breaches of the Code of Conduct in making application for registration as a practitioner when not qualified to do so and in submitting various forged and fraudulent documents in support of that application. In the case of FMLA, the claim was brought pursuant to Article 38 of the Code on the ground that the submission of forged and fraudulent documents to the Court relating to Mr Morgan’s entitlement to practise is a breach of the Code.

75. Mr Morgan stated that he consented to his removal from the Register of Practitioners and would make no comment on the investigations undertaken by the Court, which he characterised as “nothing more than internet searches”.⁸

76. Mr Morgan stated to the Court that he would provide documents verifying his admission to practise in the United States. When asked why he had not done so within the period of more than three months of being requested to do so in mid November 2023, he responded that it took 12 weeks for the Secretary of State to attest and then more time for verification.⁹

77. In response to that assertion I observed that he could have submitted documents from the relevant Courts without waiting for verification from the Secretary of State, and questioned whether he had provided any specific response to the allegations that the documents that he had provided were forged. Mr Morgan responded to that question by asserting that his response was limited to the assertion that all the documents would be attested by the appropriate government authority in Washington, which was the Secretary of State and then further notarised by the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington and then further attested by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He refused to respond to the allegations of forgery.

78. I then asked Mr Morgan whether he denied that he had been imprisoned in the United States, because his statements were not clear on that fact. Mr Morgan replied to that question by criticising the document provided by the Registrar to the Court. When I repeated the question Mr Morgan stated:

“I deny the accusation that is against me”.

79. When I repeated my question for the third time, Mr Morgan stated:

“I deny the accusation that is against me, your Honour, because it is not complete. Without being able to completely provide substance to that allegation then, on its merits, it cannot be answered.”¹⁰

80. When I repeated my question for the fourth time, Mr Morgan sought clarification of whether I was talking about imprisonment for a short term “in an overnight drunk tank” or imprisonment for a felony conviction.

81. When I repeated my question for the fifth time, Mr Morgan replied:

“I have never been in prison for the allegation of fraud or dishonesty as alleged by the Registrar.”¹¹

82. When I asked Mr Morgan, for the sixth time, whether he had been imprisoned in the United States he replied:

“Not for the allegation of the fraud or dishonesty.”¹²

83. I then asked Mr Morgan whether he was going to answer my question or not. To which he replied:

“I tried to, your Honour, but it is not a simple yes or no answer.”¹³

84. When I repeated my question, yet again, Mr Morgan replied:

“The answer to your question is, are you asking have I been in prison on a felony conviction? The answer to that question is no.”¹⁴

85. When I repeated the question yet again, Mr Morgan stated that he had spent overnight imprisonment in the US for drink driving on two different offences. He denied that he had been imprisoned in the United States on any other occasions.

86. I then questioned Mr Morgan in relation to the assertion in his first statement to the effect that on 9 December 2012 (being one day before the date upon which the documents produced by the Registrar suggest that Mr Morgan was released from imprisonment) he had received an exoneration from the US Department of Justice given under a sealed order because of misconduct by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Mr Morgan asserted that the exoneration related to 52 indictments of financial crime.

87. I then asked Mr Morgan why he had not produced the order provided under seal of the US Federal Court. Mr Morgan responded to that question by asserting that he had been advised by his attorney at the time that he could not disseminate the document in the public sphere. When I pointed out that he could have provided the document to the Court on a confidential basis in answer to the very serious allegations made against him, and asked why he did not do so, he stated that he:

“…was under instructions from my attorneys in the US at the time, in 2009, that such document cannot be provided in such a manner.”¹⁵

88. When I suggested that the exoneration was in 2012, not 2009, Mr Morgan denied that proposition (contrary to his statement) and asserted that:

“There seems to be so many dates thrown around here, there and everywhere, this date that date … in the attempts to try to remedy this we have been given no opportunity.”¹⁶

89. Mr Al Marri appeared on behalf of FMLA. In the course of his submissions, he asserted:

“We were never asked for any document, any further clarification or documents. I have no clarity what is going on. Once I understand there is a suspension related to documents, I involve myself to communicate on what document being provided by Shaun Morgan, not because what I confirm this document or I am sure about that document, whatever he forward to me I forward to the Registrar.”¹⁷

90. I then observed that the statement he had just made was precisely the point of the Registrar’s claim – namely, that in a context in which FMLA were aware that there was a serious question as to Mr Morgan’s entitlement to be registered as a practitioner, the firm forwarded to the Court documents which were forged and fraudulent without making due enquiry as to the veracity of those documents.18 I pointed out to Mr Al Marri that the Registrar’s case was that by reason of that conduct, the firm was not fit to remain on the list of firms entitled to represent parties in proceedings before the DIFC Courts. I then requested Mr Al Marri to respond to the case put in that way. He replied:

“I only forward what I have been given as information. I forward to the Registrar and it is up to them to check and to confirm. I am not the authority to check, verify and to know the quality of the documents and the paperwork which came to me.”¹⁹

91. I put to Mr Al Marri that in a context in which he knew serious questions had been raised in relation to the legitimacy of documents that had been provided in support of Mr Morgan’s application for registration, providing documents to the Court which were in fact fraudulent and forged without making any enquiry whatsoever into the legitimacy of those documents was conduct falling well short of the standards of practice expected of reputable legal practitioners such that FMLA should not remain on the Register. When I invited Mr Al Marri to respond to that proposition he said:

“I have a hearing and the document being supplied by Shaun, and the same being forward to the Registrar.”²⁰

92. I then put to Mr Al Marri:

“So you did not do anything. Even though you were aware that the allegation was that he had provided forged or fraudulent documents, you simply passed on more documents that he gave to you without checking whether they were forged or fraudulent. Is that the position?”

93. Mr Al Marri replied:

“We are not aware of it being forged.”²¹

94. Mr Al Marri then stated that FMLA wished to remove Shaun Morgan as a practitioner of the firm and register other lawyers, and requested reinstatement for that purpose.

95. Mr Al Marri asserted that he was not aware of any allegation to the effect that Mr Morgan had provided forged documents to the Court at the time he provided documents to the Court (which were also forged) on 23 November 2023. In that context I put to Mr Al Marri that he was aware that Mr Morgan had been suspended from practice on 17 November 2023 and had been asked to provide sealed documents relating to his registration as a practitioner. He stated that he did not know why Mr Morgan had been suspended. I put to Mr Al Marri that he must surely have been aware that he was suspended because there were doubts with respect to his registration in the United States, because of the request that documents be provided to prove that registration. Mr Al Marri denied that the firm was aware that there were any questions in relation to Mr Morgan’s registration in the United States.²² That denial cannot be reconciled with the extensive email correspondence between Mr Morgan, Mr Al Marri and the Court in the latter part of November 2023 which is referred to above.

Consideration

96. It is appropriate to consider the claims against Mr Morgan and FMLA separately. Before doing so however, there are some issues which are common to both claims.

97. First, both Mr Morgan and FMLA belatedly assert, in their skeleton arguments, that the proceedings were not validly served upon them because they did not consent to service by email. However, they do not deny receiving the documents served by the Registrar in the course of the proceedings and they have responded to those documents in the manner which I have set out above before taking a point with respect to the efficacy of service at the eleventh hour. In these circumstances each has obviously acquiesced in the manner of service, and waived any entitlement to assert that service was defective and it is unnecessary to consider whether, upon a strict analysis of the Rules service would have been effective without such acquiescence and waiver.

98. The fact that each have taken such a technical and unmeritorious point against the Court of which they were practitioners (albeit suspended) is itself indicative of a lack of fitness for registration.

99. Second, no party provided submissions to me with respect to the standard of proof which I should adopt in relation to the findings of fact which I must make. Article 38 of the Code expressly states that the standard of proof applicable to breach of that Article is proof on the balance of probabilities. Article 40 is silent on the question. It could be argued that the balance of probabilities should be adopted in respect of Article 40, by analogy to Article 38, or, perhaps, that the absence of an explicit statement in Article 40 connotes some different, perhaps higher standard of proof.

100. As the matter was not addressed in argument, it would not be appropriate for me to purport to determine the issue. In any case it is unnecessary to do so, as the evidence before the Court establishes the contraventions of Articles 38 and 40 beyond any reasonable doubt.

The case against Mr Morgan

101. The first limb of the case against Mr Morgan relies upon Article 40 of the Code, and the proposition that he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment and has been convicted of an offence involving dishonesty or fraud. This raises the question of whether the Shaun Gregory Morgan who was registered as a practitioner of the DIFC Courts is the same Shaun Gregory Morgan who was convicted of offences of dishonesty on his plea of guilty in the United States District Court in Utah in 2009.

102. I am satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that the Shaun Gregory Morgan who was convicted of offences of dishonesty in Utah in 2009 and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 60 months is one and the same as the Shaun Gregory Morgan who was registered as a practitioner of this Court. The evidence establishes that the person convicted of fraud in Utah in 2009 was from New Zealand, which is of course where the person who was registered as a practitioner was born. While one can conceive of the possibility that there might be two persons with the same name, the prospect that the person who is convicted for fraud in Utah and the person who was registered as a practitioner of this Court under the same name were both born in New Zealand seems very remote.

103. This conclusion is reinforced by Mr Morgan’s response to the allegation. In his written statements he conspicuously failed to assert, definitively, that he was not the person who was convicted of fraud in Utah. Rather, his statements were concerned with disparaging the evidence upon which the Registrar relied, based upon an asserted inconsistency between the date of release and the length of the term of imprisonment imposed. Further, and significantly, in Mr Morgan’s first statement, in a response which is clearly directed to the Registrar’s allegation that he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the United States, he stated:

“Furthermore, if requested it would have been provided in a closed meeting with the Registrar that on December 9 2012, I received an exoneration from the US Department of Justice which was given under a sealed order pursuant to a very serious misconduct by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.”

104. 9 December 2012 is one day before the documents establish that the Shaun Gregory Morgan who was imprisoned for fraud in Utah was released from prison. It seems most unlikely that the connection between these two dates is coincidental. Rather, in the context in which the statement above was made, it seems clear that it was intended by Mr Morgan to relate to, and answer, the allegation that he had been imprisoned for fraud. Of course, such an assertion is entirely inconsistent with the proposition that he was not the Shaun Gregory Morgan who was in fact imprisoned for fraud three years earlier. Between making this allegation in December 2023, and the hearing in March 2024, Mr Morgan must have come to appreciate this inconsistency, which is why, when questioned about it, he asserted that the exoneration related to 52 offences which were apparently unrelated to the charges in Utah.

105. I do not accept any of Mr Morgan’s statements on this topic. If the offences in respect of which he was granted exoneration were unrelated to the charges in Utah, there is no reason why he would have referred to them in his first statement. Further, even though Mr Morgan asserts that he was given documents under seal to prove his exoneration, no such document has ever been produced to the Court, and the explanation given by Mr Morgan for that failure is utterly implausible.

106. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Morgan’s statements in relation to his asserted exoneration are a complete concoction, devised in a misguided and illconsidered attempt to answer the allegation relating to his imprisonment for fraud in Utah.

107. My conclusion on this topic is further corroborated by Mr Morgan’s extraordinary prevarication during the hearing, when question about imprisonment in the United States, and which I have set out above. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his persistent refusal to answer a simple and direct question, put to him many times, was because of his concern with respect to the potential ramifications of making a false statement to the Court. His evasive answers gave him time to consider the course which he should follow although, in the result, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that his assertion that he had only ever been in prison for driving offences in the United States is a complete concoction designed to explain his prevarication. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Morgan has quite deliberately lied to the Court in relation to his imprisonment in the United States.

108. As the fact of his imprisonment in the United States invokes the application of Article 40 of the Code, it is unnecessary to consider whether the evidence establishes that Mr Morgan was also imprisoned in Switzerland – a topic upon which the evidence is less clear. It is sufficient to observe that as I am satisfied of his imprisonment in the United States, pursuant to Article 40 of the Code I am empowered to terminate Mr Morgan’s right to remain enrolled on the Register of Practitioners.

109. The second limb of the Registrar’s claim against Mr Morgan is based upon Article 38, and the assertion that Mr Morgan has committed various breaches of the Code. Those breaches essentially lie in his application for registration as a practitioner on the basis of representations which he knew to be false relating to his registration as a legal practitioner in various jurisdictions in the United States, and in reliance upon a forged document attesting to his good standing before the Court of Appeals of Maryland. His failure to disclose his conviction and imprisonment for fraud is another aspect of his contraventions of the Code.

110. On the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Morgan has never been admitted as a legal practitioner in any of the jurisdictions to which he referred in his application for registration and that he provided a forged Certificate of Good Standing in support of his application, and failed to disclose his prior conviction and imprisonment for fraud. I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Morgan compounded those contraventions of the Code by supplying two more forged certificates to Mr Al Marri, who then supplied them to the Court. Mr Morgan provided another forged document to the Court in February 2024. The contraventions were further compounded by Mr Morgan’s repeated assertions that he is indeed registered as a practitioner in the United States, although he has never produced any legitimate document to substantiate that assertion. By the time of the hearing on 14 March 2024, Mr Morgan had had almost four months to produce legitimate documents substantiating his admission to practice from the time when questions were first raised in mid-November 2023. His explanation for not producing such documents is utterly implausible and I reject it.

111. Mr Morgan’s conduct gives rise to the following contraventions of the Code:

The claim against FMLA

112. The claim against FMLA is more confined. As already noted, the claim is essentially based upon FMLA’s production of forged and fraudulent certificates to the Court without making any enquiry as to the veracity of those certificates at a time when it must have been aware that the question of Mr Morgan’s entitlement to registration was under investigation. That conduct is exacerbated by the robust and false statements made by Mr Al Marri at the time, in his capacity as Managing Partner of the firm, to the effect that he could personally confirm that the allegations made against Mr Morgan were baseless, when he had no grounds for making that assertion. Those statements were repeatedly made to the Court and also to another firm of practitioners.

113. Mr Al Marri admitted these allegations during the hearing, in the terms which I have set out above. It is clear from the statements that he made to the Court that he made no enquiry whatever with respect to the veracity of the documents which he provided to the Court, or for the purpose of substantiating the very firm assertions which he had made to the effect that the allegations against Mr Morgan were baseless. I do not accept his assertion that he was not aware that there was a suspicion that Mr Morgan had provided forged documents at the time he was being asked to provide documents to prove Mr Morgan’s registration as a practitioner in the United States. But even if Mr Al Marri was telling the truth in that regard, it speaks of such extraordinary gullibility and naivete as to reveal unfitness to manage a firm entitled to represent parties in proceedings in the DIFC Courts.

114. The evidence falls short of establishing that Mr Al Marri or FMLA knew that Mr Morgan’s claims to registration in the United States were false, but it does establish that neither Mr Al Marri nor the firm made any enquiry with respect to the veracity of those claims before repeating them to the Court and providing forged and fraudulent documents in support of those claims. That conduct constitutes contraventions of the following provisions of the Code:

Sanctions

115. Systems for the registration of practitioners entitled to practice before Courts are designed to ensure that such practitioners have appropriate qualifications, skills and experience, and appropriate personal qualities of honesty and integrity, and to ensure adherence to appropriate ethical standards. Such systems have the dual purpose of protecting unwitting clients from persons holding themselves out as having the necessary qualifications, skills and experience to properly and adequately represent them in Court proceedings and to ensure that the Court receives the assistance of appropriately qualified practitioners who adhere to ethical standards of practice.

116. If these systems are undermined the administration of justice can be seriously compromised. Unwitting clients may forfeit their entitlement to justice because they are incompetently represented. The Court’s obligation to ensure that all parties are given fair and equal treatment, and the administration of justice can be compromised if a party is incompetently represented.

117. It is no exaggeration to say that the proper administration of systems for the registration of practitioners is fundamental to the effective administration of justice by any Court.

118. This case is an extreme example of a deliberate and calculated attempt to undermine the system for the registration of practitioners before this Court which was successful for a time. Mr Morgan is a charlatan who has not established an entitlement to practice law in any jurisdiction. He is dishonest, completely lacking in integrity, and a fraudster. In these circumstances the only appropriate remedy under each of Articles 38 and 40 is to direct his removal from the Register of Practitioners.

119. As Mr Morgan’s case is clearly within the most serious category of contravention of the provisions of the Code, it is also appropriate that the maximum penalties available under the Code be imposed upon him, being public admonition and a fine of USD 15,000.

120. FMLA assisted Mr Morgan in the perpetration of his attempts to deceive the Court and the clients of the firm. In circumstances in which the firm must have been aware that there was a serious question in relation to Mr Morgan’s entitlement to be registered as a practitioner, the firm reiterated his false assertions dogmatically, without any proper basis for doing so. Further, the firm provided forged and fraudulent documents to the Court without making any enquiry whatever as to their veracity, when clearly such enquiry was called for.

121. This conduct falls so far beyond the standards of conduct expected of reputable law firms that it must be concluded that the firm is not fit and proper to remain on the register of firms entitled to represent parties to proceedings before the DIFC Courts. Further, the firm’s participation in conduct which undermined the system for the registration of practitioners strikes at a fundamental basis for the administration of justice by the Court, and brings the case against the firm into the most serious category of contraventions of the Code. It follows that, in addition to directing the removal of the firm from the register of firms entitled to represent parties before the Courts, the maximum penalties available under Article 38 of the Code should be imposed – namely public admonition and a fine of USD 50,000.

FMLA’s application of 31 January 2024

122. As noted above, the disposition of FMLA’s application of 31 January 2024 was overlooked at the time I pronounced orders at the conclusion of the hearing on 14 March 2024. That application was for an order removing Mr Morgan from the practitioners registered in respect of the firm, and for reinstatement of the firm. Obviously, Mr Morgan is not now registered as a practitioner at all, and the firm has been removed from the register by reason of the orders which were made on 15 March 2024. As the application is inconsistent with those orders it must be dismissed, and there will be an order to that effect.

Issued by:
Hayley Norton
Assistant Registrar
Date of issue: 18 April 2024
At: 8am